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STATE1IENT OF THE CASE
. (The numbers in parentheses refer to pages in the
Record).
The trial court, upon return of a jury verdict in favor
of plaintiff, granted defendant's 1\fotion for a Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and plaintiff prosecutes this
appeal from the judgment of no cause _of action.
On December 5, 1949, while plaintiff was riding in a
truck being driven by his business partner, he was injured
as a result of a collision which occurred between said
truck and an automobile being driven by defendant at the
intersection of W P~t Temple and 33rd South Streets, Salt
Lake City, Utah.
The plaintiff admits that the negligence, if any, of the
driver of the truck may be imputed to plaintiff-passenger.
Thirty-third South Street is a two-lane highway located in Salt Lake County extending in an easterly and
westerly direction and is intersected by West Temple
Street, which extends in a northerly and southerly direction. On the date of the accident the driver of plaintiff'~
vehicle was driving in an easterly direction along Thirtythird South Street (R. 38) at a speed of approximately
15 to 20 miles per hour (R. 40). At a distance approximatPly 100 feet wP~t of the intersection of \YP:-;t Temple
~trePt he extended his arm in a horizontal position, indi-
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eating- a left-hand turn at the intersection. He maintained
hi~ arrn in this position until he reached the center of the
intersection when he was struck in the rear by the defendant's Yehicle (R. -t-2). The driver of plaintiff's vehicle te~tified that at the time of the impact the front of
his Yehicle was near the yellow lines in the center of the
two streets. He stated his vehicle came to rest at a point
slightl~"" north of the property line on the north side of
Thirty-third South Street and on the east half of West
Temple Street. He testified that defendant's vehicle came
to rest near the point of impact (R. 45).
The defendant testified that he was proceeding east
on Thirty-third South Street at a speed of from 45 to 50
miles per hour (R. 74). When he was approximately 300
feet from the intersection of West Temple Street he
moved his vehicle into the opposite or westbound traffic
lane for the purpose of passing three vehicles, of which
plaintiff was then in the forward vehicle (R. 73). At this
point the defendant estimated that plaintiff was about 50
feet from the intersection (R. 74). The defendant then
stated that when he was 100 feet from the intersection he
became aware of plaintiff's intention to make a left-hand
turn (R. 74), that he applied his brakes and skidded a distance of 76 feet, colliding with the rear of plaintiff's vehicle (R. 77). The defendant placed the point of impact
at 15 feet west of the center of the intersection and 3 feet
north of the center line of Thirty-third South Street (R.
67).
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On cross examination plaintiff's driver testified:
'' Q.

Mr. Hayden, did you notice any cars behind you
prior to the accident 1

A.

No, sir.

Q.

You didn't notice two cars immediately behind
you and the highway patrolman then 1

A.

No, sir. I seen one pull out beside me and went
around me.

Q.

One went around you to the right 1

A.

On the right of me, yes.

Q.

Is that before you made your turn or afterward?

A.

Just as I was getting ready to make my turn
(R. 48).

"Q. Now, Mr. Hayden, tell me what you did before
you made your turn that day?
A.

Well I held my left hand out to make a left hand
turn.

Q.

You noticed the car going around your right
at that time?
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A.

No sir, not right at the time.

Q. vVhen you did you notice the car go around to
the right of you 1
A.

Just before I got ready to make my turn.

Q.

Just before you got ready to make the turn 1

A.

I'd say about 20, maybe 20 feet back he went
around me.

*

:I:

*

•

'' Q. It did go around you.
A.

Yes.

Q. Before the impact? (R. 50).
A.

Yes.

Q. And another car right behind it wasn't
A.

there~

No, sir never. seen no car or nothing in back of
1ne only that one that went around me.

Q. Did you see any car behind you at all before
the time of the crash?
A.

No, sir.

* * * *
'' Q.
A.

Did you look in your rearview mirror 1
No, sir I did not.
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Q. You
A.

didn't~

I was watching in front of me. (R. 51)."

Based upon the driver's failure to glance to the rear,
the defendant, upon completion of plaintiff's case and
prior to the case being submitted to the jury, moved the
trial court for a directed verdict on the grounds that the
driver was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
The trial court denied the motion and, in submitting the
case to the jury, included the following instruction:
"The driver of the truck has admitted by his
testimony that he did not see the automobile of the
defendant during its approach for passing at any
time before the collision, and has admitted that he
neither looked in his rear view mirror or glanced
back to see if any automobile was approaching from
the rear. If you find and believe from the evidPnrP
that the ommission of the driver of the truck in the
particular just mentioned was such an ommission as
an ordinarily reasonable, prudent and cautious person would not make under the same or similar circumstan<'Ps and that his failure in that regard is one
of the proximate causes of the collision, then you
cannot find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff anrl
against the defendant." (R. 22).
The jury then returned a verdict in favor of tlw
plaintiff and against the dPfendant and assessed <lam-
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ages in the ~mn of $3,000.00. Based upon the same
grounds a~ the directed verdirt, the defendant moved for
a Judgment Notwithstanding the Y erdict and the trial
court granted the motion. The trial court, in granting the
n1otion, filed a Ineinorandum decision in which the court
referred to 57-7-133, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, section
(a), and particularly the portion that states a vehicle
shall not be turned from a direct course or move right or
left upon a roadway 'llnless and until such movement can
he made with reasonable safety, and then stated:

''I conclude that the language underlined placed
a duty on the driver of the automobile about to make
a left turn to take reasonable measures to inform
himself of the presence of other automobiles. Ordinarily that duty can only be performed by glancing
backward or looking in a rear view mirror to ascertain if there is traffic approaching from the rear. The
driver of the truck in this case did not do this and
I conclude that his failure was negligence as a matter
of law." (R. 89).
The plaintiff contends that the reasoning and application of the law to this case by the trial court was
error and, based upon that error, this appeal is prosecuted.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED IDS RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE DRIVER OF PLAINTIFF'S VEIDCLE WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLEGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
AND THAT THIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE COLLISION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES.

The plaintiff strenuously asserts that the ruling of
the trial court in granting the Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict was a refusal by the court to permit the
jury to determine issues of fact and was a denial of plaintiff of his right to a trial h~' jury.
When a litigant desires a jury to determine conflicting and disputed issues of fact and when reasonable
minds may differ upon the said issues, then the jury
should be permitted to make its findings and the trial
court should not invade this right.
The plaintiff respectfully submits that in the case at
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bar the issue of the contributory negligence of the driver
of plaintiff's Yehirle was a disputed question of fact and
a jury question and that the trial court in granting the
nwtion usurped the funrtion of the jury.
This Court on numerous occasions has set forth rules
to be followed by trial courts in determining whether or
not a case should be subnlitted to the jury. See Shortino
v. Salt Lake and U. R. Co., 52 Utah 476, 174 Pac. 860, and
N eu·ton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 219, 134
Pac. 567. The most recent decision by this Court setting
forth the duties and responsibilities of trial courts in
taking matters from the jury is the case of Stickle v.
Union Pacific R. Co., Utah, 251 P. 2d 867, wherein this
Court stated at page 871:
"In our democratic system, the people are the
repository of power whence the law is derived; from
its initiation and creation to its final application and
enforcement, the law is the expression of their will.
The functioning of a cross-section of the citizenry as
a jury is the method by which the people express this
will in the application of law to controversies which
arise under it. Both our constitutional and statutory
provisions assure trial by jury to citizens of this
state.
"Courts, as final arbiters of law, could arrogate
to themselves arbitrary and dangerous powers by
presuming to determine questions of fact which liti-
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gants have a right to have passed upon by juries.
Part of the merit of the jury system is its safeguarding against such arbitrary power in the courts. To
the great credit of the courts of this country, they
have been extremely reluctant to infringe upon this
right, and by leaving it unimpaired have kept the
administration of justice close to the people. Of
course, the rights of litigants should not be surren·
dered to the arbitrary will of juries without regard
to whether there is a violation of legal rights as a
basis for recovery. The court does have a duty and
a responsibility of supervisory control over the action of juries which is just as essential to the proper
administration of justice as the function of the jury
itself. Nevertheless, we remain cognizant of the vital
importance of the privilege of trial by jury in our
our system of justice and deem it our duty to zealously protect and preserve it."
We submit that under these authorities the refusal
of the trial court to permit the determination of this case
by the jury to stand constituted a violation of plaintiff's
right to a trial by jury.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE DRIVER OF PLAINTIFF'S VEHICLE WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLEGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
AND THAT THIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE COLLISION.
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Plaintiff asserts that the finding of the jury on the
issue of contributory negligence should have been permitted to stand and the action of the trial court in settinp; this finding aside and holding that plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law constituted reversible error.
This Court in nu1nerous decisions has established
standards for a trial court to follow before ruling that
a plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and before taking such issue from the jury.
In Martin v. Sterens, Utah, 243 P. 2d 747, this Court
stated at page 749:
"The question of contributory negligence is us'ltally for the jury and the court should be reluctant
to take consideration of this question of fact from it.
(Citing cases) * * * The right to trial by jury should
be safeguarded. Before the issue of contributory
negligence may be taken from the jury, the defendant's burden of proving both (a) that plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence, and (b) that such
negligence proximately contributed to cause his own
injury, must be met, and established with such certainty that reasonable minds could not find to the
contrary; conversely, if there is any reasonable basis,
either because of lack of evidence, or from the evidence and the fair inferences arising therefrom, tak
en in the light most favorable to plaintiff, upon which
reasonable minds may conclude that they are not
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convinced by a preponderance of the evidence either
(a) that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or (b) that such negligence proximately contributed to cause the injury, the plaintiff is entitled
to have the question submitted to a jury."
''If a driver has to drive his car under the assumption that everyone else is apt to be negligent,
the next step would be for him to conclude that he
had better get off the streets entirely, or someone
else is likely to hit him, and abandon the streets to
those who are just willing to take chances. . . . As
hereinabove suggested, we must avoid measuring the
plaintiff's duty in charging him with negligence becaUBe he may have failed to anticipate and avert
negligence on the part of the defendant."
In Stickle v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra, this Court announced standards to be followed by the courts in deciding whether a jury or court should make a determination
of the existence or nonexistence of negligence proximately causing the injuries complained about. The Court
states on page 870 the following:
''The authorities frequently state that the question of contributory negligence is usually for the
jury. And that this is so wherever the evidence is
such that reasonable minds may differ as to its existence has been stated innumerable times, which is un·
doubtedly correct. However, in view of the fact that
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before the issue may be taken from the jury, the
defendant has the burden of establishing plaintiff's
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence it may
be a bit more precise to state that the question of
contributory negligence is for the jury whenever the
evidence is such that jurors, acting fairly and reasonably, may say that they are not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff was
guilty of negligence which proximately contributed
to cause his ozcn injury.
"It should be kept in mind that so far as the
quantum of proof necessary to take the question of
contributory negligence from the jury is concerned,
the tests are the same as with respect to primary
negligence. For instance, in a given case, there may
be some evidence upon which a finding of negligence
by the defendant could be based, yet the jury may remain in such a state of mind that they may fairly
say that they are not convinced by preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant was negligent,
and based upon such failure of proof may refuse to
find a verdict against him. It would only be when
the defendant's negligence had been established with
such certainty that all reasonable men must conclude
that he did not exercise reasonable care, that the
court would rule as a matter of law that he was
negligent and direct the jury to find a verdict
against him; conversely, if evidence were such that
reasonable 1nen may fairly say that they are not con-
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vinced fron1 a preponderance of the evidence that he
was guilty of negligence, the court could not rule
that he was negligent as a 1natter of law and take
the case from the jury.
''These principles apply in identical fashion to
the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence
except that the defendant has the burden of proof.
rrhat the evidence is such that the jury may find
from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff failed to use due care for his own safety is not
sufficient. The proof must establish his fail?tTe to do
so with such cfrtaiuty that all rfasmwl>le miuds must
so conclude before the court may rule as a matter of
law that he is precluded from Tecorcry on that
ground. The court should exercise cautiou and forbearance in considering taking questions of fact from
the jury."
Plaintiff contends that the action of the trial court
is contrary to the express language of the Ill a rtin and
Stickle cases. Plaintiff submits the verdict of thr jury
demonstrates that the jury was not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff's driver wat'
guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to
cause the accident.
Plaintiff further submits that the trial court was in
error for the reason ·that the evidence in this easP do<'s
not P~tahli:·dl the negligence of the driver of plaintiff's
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truck with such certainty that all reasonable minds must
conclude that he was negligent and that this negligence
was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The driver
testified when he was approximately 100 feet from the
intersection he extended his arm in a horizontal position to indicate a left-hand turn. (R. 42). The plaintiff
contends that this act by the driver was an indication
that he was conscious of his duty to warn vehicles to the
rear of his intention to turn, and a reasonable man could
well find that this was all that was needed to be done in
the exercise of reasonable care, and further that areasonably prudent person would have done no more. The
fact that a car passed the driver on the right just prior to
the accident, (R. 50) would indicate to the driver that his
signal had been observed and was observable to drivers
in the rear and that it was not necessary for him to give
any further warning or take any further precautions to
make the movement in reasonable safety. The plaintiff
submits that whether or not this driver had discharged
his duty was a jury question.
The plaintiff directs this Court's attention to the
Stickle case. In that case the trial court directed a verdict
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff on the
grounds that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to do something which
the court felt should have been done. This Court, in re·
versing the trial court's decision and holding that the
matter should have been submitted to a jury, stated the
following on page 871 :
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''Reverting then to the inquiry pertinent here:
Taking the evidence and the fair inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
could reasonable minds remain in such a state that
they could fairly say that they were not convinced
by a preponderance of the evidence that he failed to
use due care for his own safety.
''In analyzing the evidence to answer this, there
are four points which give support to plaintiff's
contention :

* * * *
"and (d) further, he testified that he did make
a test by pulling his weight on the band and it held
him.

* * * •
"It appears to us that under the circumstances
here shown, taking into consideration factors (a),
(b), (e) and (d) as just set out reasonable men could
well believe that the precaution plaintiff did tak<• was
sufficient to meet the test of ordinary~ reasonable
care for his own safety. Or more accurately~ that
reasonable minds could fairly say that tlwy were not
convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that
he failed to use such degree of care. Aeeordinp;ly,
the question of his contributory negligence should
have been submitted to the jnry."
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Lloyd r. Southern Pacific Co., (Cal. App.), 245 P.
:.2d 583, a crossing case, held the issue of contributory
negligence was for the jury. Upon a verdict for plaintiff
and the denial of defendant's motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict the defendant appealed. In affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's motion
and in citing from another California case, the court
stated the following on page 588:

'' * * * \Vhere it is shown that plaintiff has exercised some care, the question of whether or not the
care actually exercised was due and sufficient will
always be a matter for determination by the jury.''
We submit that under these authorities the action of
the trial court in arbitrarily determining the question of
due care was erroneous.
Plaintiff further contends the trial court erred in
holding the failure of the driver to glance to the rear was,
as a matter of law, the proximate cause of the accident.
The trial court in its memorandum decision stated (R.
89):

'' * * * had he glanced to the rear or looked in his
rear view mirror at any time during the interval that
he says he had his hand extended from the left window of the car he would have seen a highway patrol
car proceeding at a speed three times that at which
the truck was traveling and would have known that
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he could not, as he did not, make the left turn without being struck. I therefore conclude that his negligence was a proximate cause of the collision and resulting injury to the plaintiff.''
In construing the above language, there can be little
wonder that the trial court reached the erroneous result
that defendant was entitled to a judgn1ent when the court
failed to take into consideration the fart that in order for
the glance to the rear to be the proximate cause, the
driver must have had an opportunity to prevent the accident. Again we submit the facts do not show any time
at whiC'h the driver could have prevented the accident if
he had glanced to the rear. The plaintiff further ass('rts
that this consideration of the evidence suhstantiat('s
plaintiff's claim because if the driver had glanced to the
rear when he first extended his arm, the conduct of the
defendant at that time cannot be said, as a matter of law,
to have conveyed to the driver the intention of the defendant to pass him in the intersection and interfere with
his left-hand turn.
Further, plaintiff contends that if the driver had
glanced to the rear at the time the defendant moved his
vehicle to the opposite lane of traffic, the driver at this
moment was not granted an opportunity to prPYPnt the
accident because the point of impact occurred within an
interval of approxinmtely two seconds.
Therefore, plaintiff submits the holding of the court
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that the driver of plaintiff's vehicle was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law and that his negligence was
a proximate cause of the accident was in error and contrary to the evidence.
The following cases are similar to the case at bar
and hold that the question of contributory negligence was
a jury question :
In the case of Turner v. McMillan, 140 Ore. 407, 14
P. 2d 294. plaintiff and defendant were proceeding in
the san1e direction, plaintiff being ahead of defendant.
Plaintiff attempted to make a left-hand turn when de·
fendant was attempting to pass plaintiff and an accident
ensued. The case was submitted to the jury and, upon a
verdict for plaintiff, defendant appealed. Defendant contended the testimony of plaintiff indicated he was negligent as a matter of law in his failure to give the proper
signal and to observe the defendant 100 feet prior to his
turn. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed on an instruction concerning damages, but with respect to the
question of plaintiff being negligent as a matter of law,
the court stated at page 295:
'' * * * In support thereof, defendant argues that it
affirmatively appears from plaintiff's testimony that
plaintiff was negligent in failing to give the statutory signal of intention to turn to his left, and in fail·
ing to observe the whereabouts of defendant's car
during the time that plaintiff was driving the last 100

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

feet before collision. \Ye think that there is evidence
tending to show that as to defendant, plaintiff gave
the statutory signal, namely, that of extending the
arm horizontally. * * * \Ve think also that whether
plaintiff was negligent in failing to observe the location of defendant's car during the last hundred
feet of his ill-fated ride is a matter to be submitted to
the jury. The testimony tends to show that plaintiff
was then traveling at the rate of ten miles an hour.
At that rate 100 feet would be traYersed in approximately 6.82 seconds. We are unwilling to hold plaintiff guilty of negligence, as a matter of law, for his
failure to look for defendant's car during that interval or less than seven seconds. For these reason~
we conclude that no error was con1mitted by the
learned trial judge in overruling the motions for
nonsuit and directed verdict.'' * * *
Another similar case is Burns v. Standring, et al.,
148 \Vash. 291, 268 Pac. 866. There plaintiff and defendant were proceeding in the same direction and plaintiff
was ahead of defendant from 75 to 300 feet. About 80 to
90 feet before plaintiff made a left hand turn, he gave
the proper arm signal and the defendant, in attempting
to pass him, struck him. Upon a verdict for plaintiff, defendant appealed, contending that plaintiff was guilty
of negligence as a 1natter of law. In affirming the decision, the court stated as follows, page 867:

"* * * The assignments of error are all based upon
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the contention that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The sole
question presented is, Can the Court say as a matter
of law that one driving a car and attempting to make
a left turn off a highway after having given the
proper signal is guilty of contributory negligence if
he does not also look to the rear to discover whether
or not there is an overtaking car attempting to
pass~

*••

"We have many times held that where a person testifies that he looked or failed to look and did not see
an object which is plainly apparent, and thus moves
into a dangerous zone, and an accident thereby results, he is guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law. But, in so far as this is applicable to
drivers of automobiles, we think this applies only to
objects in front of the driver and within his apparent
range of vision.

'' * * * We think the driver of a car has the right to
asume that overtaking traffic attempting to pass will
give a timely signal as required by the Automobile
Code. We think all the authorities hold that it is the
duty of the driver of an overtaking car to exercise
care with respect to the forward car. (Citing cases).
We now hold that it is the duty of the driver of an
automobile to guard against traffic in front of him,
to give timely warl\ing of his intention to leave the
highway, and that· if, after having given timely
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warning of this intention to leave the highway, he
is injured by an overtaking car, the question of contrilmtory negligence is for the j1try."
Plaintiff submits that considering the evidence in a
light most favorable to him that a reasonable mind could
conclude that the movement of the truck, if any, from a
direct course or to the left was not a proximate ran~e of
the collision. The driver of the true k testified that at the
time of the collision the front end of the truck wa~ at or
near the center line and that the rear portion of his truck
was not over the center line of 33rd South Street (R. 39
and 45). The testimony also disclosed that the front end
of defendant'~ car hit the rear portion of plaintiff'~ truck
( R. -t 1 and 44). From this the jury could conclude that
the slowing down of the truck caused defendant to overtake it so fast he was unable to stop in time to avoid the
collision. The fact that defendant was approaching from
the rear would not require the driver of the truck to continue easterl~T along the highway in order to PseapP being run down. ( \•rtainl~T he could slow down or stop. The
junT could have found that before his movement to the
left had become effective the collision had occurred because the defendant had run him down. In sn<'h event, it
could not or cannot be said that any movement to the
left was a substantial <·awmtive factor in <·ansillg· the <'Ollision.
CON( 1.USTON
1

Pnder the foregoing authoritiPs, it is apparent that
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the trial court in granting defendant's motion for J udgment Notwithstanding the Yerdict denied to plaintiff his
right of trial by jury and also erroneously decided questions of fact that had been correctly submitted to a jury
and decided by the jury adversely to the defendant. For
these reasons, we submit that this Honorable Court
should reverse the judgment of the trial court and reinstate the judgment entered upon the verdict of the jury.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND R. BRADY and
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE
Attorneys for Appellant
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

